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Abstract— A number of security risks are associated with the 
selection of wireless networks. We examined wireless network 
choices in a study involving 104 undergraduate social science 
students. One research goal was to examine the extent to which 
features (such as padlocks) and colours could be used to ‘nudge’ 
individuals towards more secure network and away from open 
(unsecured) network options. Another goal was to better 
understand the basis for their decision-making. Using qualitative 
as well as quantitative data, we were able to differentiate groups 
whose decision were driven by security concerns, those who made 
convenience-based decisions, and those whose motives were 
unclear or undefined. These groups made different network 
choices, in part due to different perceived functionality of the 
padlock. We further observed significant effects for the use of 
colour when nudging participants towards more secure choices. 
We also wanted to examine the role of individual differences in 
relation to the choices individuals make. Perceived 
controllability of risk played a role in terms of the extent to which 
participants would make more secure vs. unsecure choices, 
although we obtained no significant group differences when we 
examined these variables in relation to the different decision 
justification groups. This indicates that perceived risk 
perceptions and reasons for decisions may relate differently to 
the actual behavioural choices individuals make, with 
perceptions of risk not necessarily relating to the reasons that 
participants consider when making security decisions.  
Keywords—user perception; security; padlock; usability 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The focus of our research was to examine what information 
people utilize when making security-related decisions. Given 
the prevalence and known security risks of public wireless 
networks [1], we decided to examine decision making in 
relation to the selection of public wireless networks.  At 
present, public wireless networks pose a significant risk to data 
security as they provide a clear opportunity for many cyber-
attacks (snooping or mac spoofing, man in the middle, see [2] 
or [3]). Public networks are often unsecured and unmonitored, 
leaving the network vulnerable to various attacks aimed at the 
network itself or on individuals using the network [4]. Using 
encryption via a password, as indicated by a padlock, can help 
to limit access. However, even if the network is encrypted, 
users are still not completely safe. Using encryption methods is 
helpful, but again some methods are better than others.  
Reports about the insecurity of public wireless networks 
may decrease user confidence and results in people avoiding 
their use. But as more people use them, and their use does not 
appear to result in any negative consequence (as far as the 
average user can tell), the sense of risks associated with the use 
of the “hotspots”  and the internet is reduced [5]. In other 
words, we may be aware of the risks associated with using 
mobile devices and wireless network options, but we are also 
becoming rather blasé about the need to mediate our behaviour 
and reduce known risks.  Various attempts have been made to 
engage users to adopt more secure behaviours, for instance 
issuing guidelines [6] and personalized messages [7]. It is also 
possible for a company to set up a list of trusted networks – i.e. 
networks the company have evaluated and would prefer their 
staff to utilise. Unfortunately, these approaches are not always 
likely to be followed through in practice. 
Another approach is to help the users make the best security 
decisions they can by making it easier for them to locate and 
identify the most secure option amongst those presented to 
them at any one time. Given the prolific use and associated 
risks of public wireless networks, we wished to examine 
whether the design of the interface used to present network 
options can influence the choices made. That is, we wanted to 
see if we can ‘nudge’ novice users to select more secure 
network options by changing the choice architecture of options 
presented [8]. Past evidence suggests that forcing users to 
adopt higher security can result in a high false alarm rate. It 
may also lead to lower compliance and reduce their willingness 
to follow subsequent advice provided by the system [9]. If 
users retain the ability to choose security levels – with choice 
architecture – they can then find their own balance between 
usability and security. They are more likely to trust the system, 
comply with suggested behaviours and find the associated 
effort acceptable [9]. There are important implications here for 
designing choice architecture for wireless network selection, 
including allowing the user to decide on the security versus 
productivity balance for their particular context. 
However, it is unclear which designs are most effective. As 
a result, we also wanted to examine the effect of alternative 
nudge designs when attempting to influence users towards 
making more ‘secure’ and ‘trusted’ network decisions as 
opposed to ‘open’ network choices. The presence of different 
security labels for different networks was also of interest as a 
nudging mechanism, such as the use of labels such as ‘secure’ 
to show that a network is using a password to encrypt the data 
transmitted. The presence of a padlock is indicative of a secure 
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network and can therefore be important in influencing the 
choice of networks. Past research suggests that designers can 
improve the perceived trustworthiness of web browsers by 
adding padlocks into the address bar [10]. Mozilla provides a 
Site Identity Button which allows users to assess whether or 
not the visited websites are encrypted, if it is verified, and by 
whom [11], a feature that is similar to other site advisors 
frequently offered by various virus scanning software 
programmes. Padlocks are also included as a feature elsewhere, 
including transactions, wireless network options, and software 
[12]. We explored these issues by manipulating the presence 
and absence of padlocks and by logging choices but also by 
examining the decision justifications users made for particular 
network selection. 
II. NETWORK CHOICE AND PADLOCKS 
A. Research questions 
Using information about the reasons for specific network 
choices may improve our understanding how users justify their 
decisions and what types of information they tend to consider. 
In addition, knowing more about user differences may help us 
gain another perspective on user behaviour.  
The research questions we hoped to answer were as 
follows:  
(1) Do padlocks act as a barrier or facilitator of secure 
network use?  
(2)  Can menu order and colour (that is, the presentation of 
network options) act as nudges to influence network 
choice?  
 (3)  How do individual differences such as technical self-
efficacy, perceived controllability and vulnerability to 
risk influence security decisions?  
 (4)  Do individual differences such as technical self-
efficacy, perceived controllability and vulnerability 
predict the security of the networks participants will 
select?  
Essentially, we wanted to conduct an investigation of the 
efficacy of different nudges on wireless network security 
decisions, taking into account a range of individual differences 
and user perceptions in relation to risk and rationale.  Our 
exploratory stance considers the user as a rational (if not a 
secure) decision-maker. In this instance, we are therefore 
taking a user-centric perspective.  
The answers to the research questions will provide some 
preliminary evidence to support educational awareness 
campaigns on university campuses or other public spaces 
where public wireless networks are frequently available and 
utilized by the general public. 
B. Study materials 
We developed a series of 6 screen shots to explore our 
research questions. The screenshots were based on the Android 
default display. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
The six different screenshots each presented six network 
options, four of which were secure network choices (labelled 
‘secure’ or ‘trusted’) and two of which were labelled ‘open’ 
and excluded padlocks (unsecure options).  
We used randomly generated network names to avoid 
biasing the results due to perceived familiarity with the 
network (see work on this by [13].)  
The different screen shots varied in terms of presentation of 
networks. Three design features were manipulated. Firstly the 
order of the networks was manipulated: networks were 
presented in alphabetical ordering (with an open network 
appearing in the first position) or ordered in terms of security 
of networks (listing first ‘trusted’, then ‘secure’ and lastly 
‘open’ network options). Secondly, colour was used. Some 
screenshots listed all available networks in white (no colour 
coding). Others used a colour coding scheme (using a traffic 
light system with trusted being green, secure being orange and 
open being the red). And third, networks were presented with 
or without a padlock symbol being present. The signal strength 
indicator was also present on the screen.  Screen 1 represents 
the original android display. An overview is presented in Table 
1. 
We were also interested in the influence of individual 
differences such as technological self-efficacy, perceived 
controllability of risk and perceived vulnerability to risk, and 
IT proficiency. We used a number of self-report measures; self-
efficacy [14]; perceived controllability [15]; perceived 
vulnerability [14] and IT proficiency. In addition, we collected 
general information about participant’s age, gender, use of 
computers in home and work.  
C. Procedure and participants 
Our preliminary evaluation was conducted with 104 
university students. We recruited non-computing students that 
were familiar with using wireless networks on campus at 
Northumbria University. All participants could earn research 
credits for their respective programs.  
Participants were given the following scenario (see [4]): 
They have an hour to submit some urgent work and decide to 
go to a public café to connect to the Internet. In this context, 
they are presented with a screen of networks available. 
Screenshot images were randomly presented to reduce order 
effects. Participants were then asked to indicate their first 
choice from the available networks on the six screen shots and 
to explain the reasons for their choice. These explanations 
suggested that trusted implied secure for almost all 
participants.  
Participants who were colour-blind were excluded from 
the study as the displays included red and green colour coding 
TABLE 1.   FEATURES OF THE DIFFERENT SCREENSHOTS 
Screenshot characteristics 
(1) random, white, padlock present (android default) 
(2) ordered, white, padlock present 
(3) random, coloured, padlock present 
(4) ordered, coloured, padlock present 
(5) random, white*, no padlock 
(6) ordered, coloured*, no padlock 
 
TABLE 3.   DECISION JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR NETWORK CHOICES  
 
Decision justifications 
 security-driven convenience-based unknown 
Network presentation a. secure/ trusted open secure/ trusted open secure/ trusted open 
(1)     Random, white 15 (51.7%) 14 (48.3%) 0 (0.0%) 21 (100%) 13 (21.1%) 41 (75.9%) 
(2)     Ordered, white 18 (62.1%) 11 (37.9%) 0 (0.0%) 21 (100%) 17 (31.5%) 37 (68.5%) 
(3)     Random, coloured 27 (93.1%) 2 (6.9%) 3 (14.3%) 18 (85.7%) 28 (51.9%) 26 (48.1%) 
(4)     Ordered, coloured 28 (96.6%) 1 (3.4%) 5 (23.8%) 16 (76.2) 32 (59.3%) 22 (40.7%) 
(5)     Random, white* 4 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (80.0%) 1 (20.0%) 25 (86.2%) 4 (13.8%) 
(6)     Ordered, coloured* 29 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 21 (100%)  0 (0.0%) 53 (98.1%)   1 (1.9%) 
a. N=104 except for option (5) (here n=38). Percentage represents percent of individuals who within that category (decision justification) a specific type of 
network 
 
that might have been less compelling to these participants. 
Part-way through the study, we added a sixth screen shot was 
to the set of displays (listed as option (5) in Table 1). This 
meant that we had a more limited dataset for performance on 
the task that included this screenshot (38 participants out of 
104 participants tested overall).  
In order to examine which variables were relevant to their 
network choices, all participants were asked – after making 
their selection - to select those features they felt had most 
influenced their choice (i.e. name of the network, signal 
strength, padlock, colour, or position on screen). In addition, 
we presented all participants with an option to add their own 
comments.  
Following the completion of the choice task, we asked our 
participants to complete a follow-up questionnaire that 
included all the individual difference measures (technical self-
efficacy, perceived controllability of risk and perceived 
vulnerability to risk, IT proficiency) and demographic 
characteristics (age, gender) as well as generic use of 
computers at home and at work. 
D. Data preparation and participant characteristics 
Upon completion of the survey, we examined the open 
responses as well as features that the participants selected when 
explaining their choice of networks. Three categories of 
explanations were identified and the most frequently occurring 
explanation (mode) was used to categorize participants into 
groups based on their tendency to subscribe to any of these 
four explanations across all screens. We use the label decision 
justification to describe this new grouping measure. 
In the first group, participants selected their networks 
because they considered them to be ‘safe’ or ‘secure’. Several 
individuals also picked up on the fact they were ‘trusted’ which 
included the secure networks labelled green. The padlock 
represented security to this group. These two groups were 
combined in one category called security-driven (n=29).  
The second category included all those participants who 
explained their choice of network in terms of this network 
being ‘accessible’ or ‘unlocked’ (n=21). This means this group 
included all participants who associated the padlock with 
restricted access. Participants in this group appeared to make 
more convenience-based decisions. In the open response 
options, these participants would write brief explanations such 
as “no password needed,” “not locked,” or “open, easy access.”  
The third group included all those participants who had 
given various different reasons or none at all. We therefore 
labelled these the unknown group. We considered this group in 
our analysis in order to examine what network choices this 
group of participants made compared to those who explained 
the reasons for their choices more clearly (the first two 
categories).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When we examined the reasons for participants’ choices, 
we noted that signal strength followed by the padlock were the 
two option selected most frequently (Table 2). As we had 
randomly generated non-meaningful network names, the 
network name was selected least often and did not seem to 
affect choice (but even then we had a handful of candidates 
believing that they recognised the network names). Signal 
strength seemed to be an important factor in decision-making, 
however, our data does not allow us to discriminate if signal 
strength is more influential than the other features. Note, 
however, that in our study, each level of security had two 
signal strengths available (2 or 4 bars indicating low or high 
signal strength respectively). 
An overview of decision justification in relation to the 
network choices made by participant is presented in Table 3. 
As can be seen when comparing the columns for security-
driven, convenience-based and the unknown decision groups, 
they show different tendencies to select secure and trusted vs. 
open (and unsecure) network options. When comparing the 
security-driven vs. convenience-based group, we see a greater 
tendency for the security-driven group to select secure and 
trusted networks across the first five options (the sixth screen 
shot produced identical results).  
TABLE 2.  NETWORK CHOICE AND DECISION JUSTIFICATIONS  
Reasons for  
network choice a. 
Security 
driven 
(n=29) 
Convenience 
driven (n=21) 
Unknown 
(n=54) 
Signal strength 96.55% 100.00% 98.15% 
Padlock 93.10% 76.19% 79.63% 
Colour 51.72% 28.57% 25.93% 
Order 13.79% 28.57% 37.04% 
Network name 13.79% 4.76% 16.67% 
a.
 We utilized the information from five screenshots (n=104) as we did not 
have sufficient data for the sixth screenshots. Colour was featured in three 
screenshots only. All results represent percentage of individuals within 
each selecting these reasons. 
 
To prepare further analyses, we also computed reliability 
and created composites for all additional scales (except for IT 
proficiency). All scales performed adequately (self-efficacy 
α=.86; perceived vulnerability α=.83; perceived controllability 
r=.355, p<.001). We also computed a score for the number of 
open networks selected (sum of all choices across all five 
screen shots presented to all 104 participants). We did the same 
for the number of secure networks selected (sum of all choices 
across all five screen shots presented to all 104 participants). 
Both scores had a range of 0 to 5.  
IT proficiency varied as expected, with participants 
believing themselves to be predominantly in the intermediate 
category (n=71), rather than novices (n=21) or professionals 
(n=8) and 4 missing variables. 
III. RESULTS 
We present the results of each analysis in a separate section 
below.  
A. Network selection and decision justifications 
To answer our first research question (1), we wanted to 
know whether or not security decisions when selecting the 
preferred wireless networks were influenced by the extent to 
which individuals’ decision-making was driven by security 
concerns or convenience-based. To examine this, we used the 
new categorical variable we introduced in the previous section 
(decision justifications). The dependent variables captured the 
overall number of open and secure wireless network options 
that participants selected (the composites).  
We examined group differences using analysis of variance, 
also  controlling for a variety of covariates, such as age, 
gender, IT proficiency and use of computers at home and at 
work (n=98, 6 missing values). The results were significant for 
the selection of open wireless networks across the five 
screenshots (F(2,91)=22.08, p<.001; partial η2=.327). All 
groups differed significantly from one another in terms of the 
degree to which they selected open wireless networks (post-hoc 
analysis, all p≤.003). The results indicate that those individuals 
in the convenience-based group who based their decision on 
the extent to which a network was available or ‘unlocked’ 
(open, absence of padlock) would be more likely to select the 
open and unsecure wireless option (3.60 on average in terms of  
frequency on a scale ranging from 0 to 5). Those who made 
their decisions based on the network being considered ‘secure’ 
– the security-driven group - would select the lowest number of 
open networks (1.00 on average). As to be expected, the 
category including all participants from whom we had little 
information had an average (2.34) – those whose reasons were 
unknown or unclear – had an average located between the two 
aforementioned categories (Table 4). 
The results were also significant for the selection of secure 
(and trusted) networks across the five screenshots 
(F(2,91)=18.856, p<.001; partial η2=.293). All groups differed 
significantly from one another in terms of the degree to which 
they selected secure wireless networks (post-hoc analysis, all 
p≤.006; Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These results provide support for the suggestion that the 
basis on which our participants made decisions had a 
significant effect on the type of networks they selected.  
What this does not answer, of course, is how much effort 
the convenience-based group would go to get a password 
rather than just use an open but unsecure wireless work option.   
B. Additional verification of results on padlock perception 
To understand the influence of having a readily available 
password, we reran our experiment with a second small group 
of 34 participants. This time we told our participants that they 
also had the password to access any of the networks on the list 
on each screen shot. These participants in this second follow-
up study tended to be slightly older (range 14-67, MN=32.39, 
SD=11.42). Unfortunately, in terms of decision justifications, 
this new group tended to be of a similar mind (security-based 
justifications were important to 30 out of 34 participants). This 
meant we did not have the appropriate group sizes to run 
additional statistics. Descriptive statistics indicated that the 
results were in line with those obtained for the previous sample 
(those who emphasized security tended to select significantly 
more secure and trusted options and fewer open networks 
options; p<.05).  
Similar to the previous section, we wanted to examine if 
providing a password had a significant influence on the 
decision of our participants overall. We combined the two 
datasets and analysed whether or not the selection of options 
between the two groups (those without a password, n=104, 
compared to those with a password, n=34) would be 
significantly different from one another. We also controlled for 
age, gender, and decision justifications. As expected, the group 
that did not have the password (MN=2.21, SD=1.61, n=98) 
selected open networks significantly more often than the group 
who had access (MN=.32, SD=.91, n=34) to all networks 
(F(1,127)=26.530, p<.001).  
In other words, the group that did not have the password 
(MN=2.15, SD=1.21, n=98) also selected significantly fewer 
secure or trusted networks than the group who had access 
(MN=3.73, SD=.79, n=34) to all networks (F(1,127) =29.940, 
p<.001). This provides support for the idea that having 
password access will enable and encourage users to select more 
secure options.  
TABLE 4.  SELECTION OF OPEN NETWORKS. 
Network access (open) M SD n 
Security-driven 1.00 1.05 28 
Unknown 2.34 1.62 50 
Convenience-based 3.60 0.75 20 
 
TABLE 5.  SELECTION OF SECURE NETWORKS 
Network access (secure/trusted) M SD n 
Security-driven 3.03 0.96 28 
Unknown 2.06 1.22 50 
Convenience-based 1.15 0.37 20 
 
C. Network presentation and decision justifications 
We also wanted to find out to what extent does the 
presentation of network options (in terms of order and colour) 
influence individuals’ selection. In order to answer research 
question (2), we first looked at the percentages representing the 
frequencies with which individuals selected open vs. secure 
choices. Table 6 show what type of network options were 
selected (in percentage, across all participants). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table is a simplification of Table 3. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that nudging by design (colour and menu 
order) works. This can be seen in terms of the increasing trend 
towards secure network selection when examining selection for 
options (1) to (4).  
When we look at options (5) and (6), the two screen shots 
without padlocks, we can observe a significant shift towards 
more secure network selection. This means the absence of 
padlocks has an impact on participant choices, shifting more 
participants over to secure network selection.  
Again, the choice design of networks makes a significant 
difference. We assessed selection of networks for the last two 
options without padlock using chi-square (p=.001). When 
available public network options are listed based on security 
order and colour (option 6), participants were more likely to 
select secure networks than when the networks were not 
ordered or coloured (option 5)
1
.  
The next step involved an examination of the relationship 
between the padlock and the tendencies of participants to select 
open or secure/trusted networks using likelihood ratio (χ2). We 
utilized all screenshots that featured a padlock (options (1) to 
(4). We excluded the last two screenshots as the explanation of 
being ‘locked’ out from a network could not be assessed in the 
absence of a padlock. 
 The results for all four options indicated a significant effect 
of the decision justifications selected by our participants 
(security-driven, convenience-based, und unknown). For option 
(1) presenting networks randomly and in white, the 
convenience-driven group was observed to select a 
significantly a higher number of open networks than would 
have been expected (χ2(2)=21.38, p<.001; ratio observed to 
expected = 21/15.3). The same applied for option (2) where 
networks were ordered based on security but still in white 
(χ2(2)=27.08, p<.001; ratio observed to expected = 21/13.9). 
                                                          
1 We do need to acknowledge, however, that one cell size was smaller 
than 5 (recommended for chi-square). 
Option (3) presented options randomly, but now colouring the 
trusted networks in green, secure networks in yellow, and open 
in red. Unfortunately, the issue of greater selection of open 
networks continued to be a problem, although the frequency vs. 
expected count changed slightly (χ2(2)=36.22, p<.001; ratio 
observed to expected =  18/9.3). Option (4) presented networks 
reordered based their security status (secure first) and in colour. 
While the observed frequency further declined, it was still 
significantly higher than would have been expected for the 
category encompassing participants who had made 
convenience-based decision justifications (χ2(2)=32.85, 
p<.001; ratio observed to expected =  16/7.9).  
These ratios provide further support for the evidence 
observed in the previous section: the likelihood of people 
selecting an open (unsecure) network was significantly higher 
when they prioritised finding an unlocked network over finding 
a secure network, that is, they make convenience-based 
decisions. People who focused on making security-driven 
decision were significantly more likely to select secure options. 
Moreover, while ordering of networks and colour labels seem 
to have a positive effect of moving individuals to more secure 
choices, the evidence clearly suggests that it is more difficult to 
influence the decisions of those whose decision is biased 
towards the convenience of finding an unlocked network. 
D. Decision justifications in relation to other variables 
We were also interested to learn about the extent to which 
the decision justifications (for N=104) were associated with 
individual differences (3), particularly in terms of technical 
self-efficacy, perceived controllability and vulnerability to risk. 
We utilized ANCOVA again, controlling for the same 
covariates as before. 
Decision justifications were not associated with different 
levels of technical self-efficacy (F(2,91)=.254, p=ns). It is 
possible that since self-efficacy measures perceived capability 
rather than knowledge, that decision justifications would not be 
associated with different levels of self-efficacy. We also 
obtained no support for the suggestion that the different type of 
decision justifications were associated with different levels of 
perceived controllability of risk (F(2,91)=.240, p=ns).  
We did obtain a marginally significant group difference in 
relation to perceived vulnerability (F(2,92)=2.899, p=.060, 
partial η2=.061). However, this difference reflected differences 
in means for those whose reasons were unknown (MN=2.91, 
SD=.75) and the other two categories representing participants 
who made security-driven (MN=3.17, SD=.77) vs. 
convenience-based network decisions (MN=3.20, SD=.70). 
The last two groups had very similar levels of perceived 
vulnerability. 
As a result, we found no evidence indicating that the 
security-based or convenience-based decision-makers were 
significantly influenced by their technical self-efficacy, the 
self-reported perceived controllability or vulnerability to risk. 
E. Network selection in relation to other variables 
Next we examined the extent to which the aforementioned 
individual differences (technical self-efficacy, perceived 
TABLE 6.  CHOICES ACROSS ALL SIX SCREENS 
  Networks selected  
Network presentation a. open/unsecure secure/trusted 
(1) Random, white 73.1% 26.9% 
(2) Ordered, white 66.3% 33.7% 
(3) Random, colour 44.2% 55.8% 
(4) Ordered, coloured 37.5% 62.5% 
(5) Random, white* 13.2% 86.8% 
(6) Ordered, coloured* 1.0% 99.0% 
a. *No padlock. N=104 for options (1) to (4) and (6). N=38 for option (5). 
 
controllability and vulnerability) predict which networks 
participants will select. This research question (4) required 
regression to examine the extent to which the selection of 
open networks (on five screenshots, excluding option (5) due 
to missing values, n=104) could be predicted by individual’s 
self-efficacy and perceptions. We included the same 
covariates as in the previous analyses in the first step of the 
analysis. 
The results suggest a marginally significant prediction of 
open network choice in relation to perceived controllability of 
risk (b=.415, β=.191, t=1.88, p=.067). Open network choice 
was positively predicted by perceived controllability of risk, 
controlling for age, gender, use of computers in home and 
work, and IT proficiency. No other significant results were 
obtained in relation to technical self-efficacy or perceived 
vulnerability the open network score. 
Secure network choice was negatively predicted by 
perceived controllability of risk, controlling for age, gender, 
use of computers in home and work, and IT proficiency (b=-
.358, β=-.218, t=-2.14, p=.035). In other words: Even when 
we take various participant demographics and experience with 
and access to computers into account, participants made more 
unsecure decisions if they felt that they were better able to 
control risk (controllability). Participants made more secure 
decisions (less likely to select open networks) when they were 
more cautious regarding the perceived controllability of risk.  
Despite these findings, we observed no significant 
differences regarding controllability of risk in relation to the 
explanations given by participants (e.g., security-based, 
convenience-based or mixed explanations). This suggests that 
the reasons for selecting networks were not associated with 
different levels of perceived controllability of risk (in terms of 
security threats). Participants in the group making security-
based choices did not report lower or higher perceived 
controllability of risk compared to other groups. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, 
we could see a clear relationship between the stated rationale 
for making a decision and the type of wireless networks 
selected. In other words, our participants based their network 
selection on specific pieces of information. There is a clear 
trend indicating that security decisions were influenced by 
participant perceptions and beliefs. Group comparison showed 
that participants who tended to make convenience-based 
decisions also tended to make significantly more insecure 
decisions (that is, they would select a greater number of open 
and a smaller number of secure networks from the 
screenshots). This suggests that all those who tend to select 
networks out of convenience make the poorest security 
decisions initially and are harder to nudge. These results 
continued to be significant even after considering the various 
participant characteristics that might influence user decision-
making (IT proficiency, age and gender). 
Second, it appears that when we add colour-coded security 
levels to our networks decision making improves. At the same 
time, the absence or presence of the padlock appears to be an 
important consideration for decision-making – according to 
the decision justifications recorded by our participants. While 
some participant groups are amenable to nudging, those who 
seem to perceive padlocks as restricting access (convenience-
based category) continue to make significantly worse 
decisions regardless of how the networks are presented (with 
only slight improvements to security performance when we 
include colour labels). One possibility is that for these 
participants, the padlock presents a barrier when they are left 
uncertain about whether or not they have access (via a 
password) to the network.  
Third, we obtained no evidence participants in the three 
groups (based on decision justifications) expressed 
significantly different levels of perceived vulnerability and 
perceived controllability of risk. This suggests that either their 
decisions did not align with different risk perceptions or that 
they lacked awareness of their vulnerability to risks. 
V. LIMITATIONS  
We would be amiss to not point out a number of small 
limitations to the study.  
First, we did not provide all participants with the 
passwords. We did so intentionally to analyse the influence of 
such uncertainty. At the same time, we gave them a very 
specific scenario which had them focused on getting the job 
done (submitting an assignment within one hour). This may 
have implied an urgency that fostered a greater productivity 
than security focus when our participants made their choices.  
However, this is a productivity scenario, familiar to people 
who work away from the office. We did not have an 
alternative scenario where time pressure was not implied. It is 
therefore possible that when our participants had the 
passwords to access any of the presented networks and no 
time pressure, they would have made better choices.  
One related caveat in our research regards the fact that we 
did not consider the potential role of other security measures 
that our participants might normally use to secure wireless 
information traffic (e.g., VPN or encryption devices). When 
employing these additional measures, the user may not 
necessarily evaluate open networks as a security risk. Future 
research should therefore consider potential other variables 
that could shape user decisions. 
It is our belief that most individuals using public wireless 
networks will face comparable amount of uncertainty about 
the situation and networks, thus giving some external validity 
to our scenario. In addition, time pressure is a frequent 
determinant of satisficing behaviour, i.e. simply selecting the 
most reasonable option given the constraints. Research by [16] 
has already shown that usability and convenience are often 
predominant concerns, unless there is a much stronger 
perceived threat which might then increase their willingness to 
go to extra lengths (such as obtaining a password for a secure 
network).  
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
Our results suggest that the padlock appears to function as 
both barrier and facilitator in wireless network selection, 
depending on whether or not their selection is security-driven 
vs. convenience-based. Previous research has suggested that 
when we increase security measures that participants may then 
perceive the increased effort required to adhere to these 
measures as a barrier [17]. We believe that this also applies to 
some of our participants whose decision-making was more 
convenience-based. 
In addition, the presentation of a padlock also has another 
meaning. It designates a wireless network as secure. This is 
only partially accurate. Passwords are meant to prevent the 
unauthorized use of wireless connections. However, at the 
same time that does not mean these connections are more 
secure as evidenced in the emergence of rogue hotspots [18]. 
This means while it is reassuring that the security of a wireless 
network is something a number of participants consider in their 
choices, their perception of padlock-designated wireless 
networks as more secure is nevertheless a concern as this belief 
may then be more readily exploited by malicious users of the 
network.  
This then suggests two threats. The presence of the padlock 
may actually ‘nudge’ legitimate users towards insecure 
behaviour if they interpret the presence of a padlock as a 
barrier which requires extra effort to overcome. Furthermore, if 
the rogue network also presents the user with a stronger signal, 
they will appear even more attractive to a user.  
The ubiquitous use of padlocks may be misleading as they 
do not necessarily represent reliable security is indeed present. 
At the same time, it is easy to manipulate user perceptions 
using such symbols. The current overuse of padlocks may 
explain why our participants adopted different decision 
justifications – many of which may not just be the results of 
encountering different issues when using such sites, resulting in 
user uncertainty about the reliability of such symbols and their 
meaning. Examining how users relate to and interpret such 
symbols in relation to network choices represents an important 
contribution to understanding user decision-making and the 
influence of user uncertainty on behaviour.  
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